...Another generative idea that could not find a home in any media...
Gerrymandering has reached a point of such outrageous blatancy that it seems likely the US Supreme Court will have another look, soon. This NewYorker article dissects the problem, describing some new insights from logic and mathematics that might help the Court better to understand a foul practice that has warped and partly-stolen American democracy. A lot has changed since Justice Kennedy provided the deciding “we can’t see a way to do anything about it” vote, roughly a decade ago.
Gerrymandering has reached a point of such outrageous blatancy that it seems likely the US Supreme Court will have another look, soon. This NewYorker article dissects the problem, describing some new insights from logic and mathematics that might help the Court better to understand a foul practice that has warped and partly-stolen American democracy. A lot has changed since Justice Kennedy provided the deciding “we can’t see a way to do anything about it” vote, roughly a decade ago.
As I
describe elsewhere, voters in many “blue states” have rebelled against
their own Democratic politicians, ending gerrymandering via ballot measures. Hence, with a few dismal exceptions - like
Maryland and Illinois - this cheat has become ever-more associated with the
Republican Party.
Ideally,
solutions should come from negotiated legislation. When power abuse is
generated by legislatures themselves, courts must step in. Hence, aware that losing this battle may end
their lock on power, attorneys of the right argue that no alternative is
intrinsically fair – including “impartial commissions.” Moreover courts are
reluctant to interfere with state sovereignty.
Why did
Justice Kennedy opt for the status quo, last time? Even in the face of blatant
injustice, judges like to have two
things:
* A simple,
unambiguous metric that proves actionable harm.
* At least one clean and
simple remedy they can point to as an example.
The
first requirement has been provided recently by an elegant standard of “voter efficiency.”
But for the Court to articulate a workable remedy limiting gerrymandering, what’s needed is a fallback solution that is inarguably better than the present state of affairs - one that can be ordered if a state proves unable to devise a fair and impartial redistricting process on its own. To resolve Justice Kennedy’s dilemma, I will propose a solution so simple that it can be expressed in three sentences.
But for the Court to articulate a workable remedy limiting gerrymandering, what’s needed is a fallback solution that is inarguably better than the present state of affairs - one that can be ordered if a state proves unable to devise a fair and impartial redistricting process on its own. To resolve Justice Kennedy’s dilemma, I will propose a solution so simple that it can be expressed in three sentences.
Here
are those three sentences:
THE MINIMAL OVERLAP PLAN
1. With
allowances for contorted state borders, like Maryland’s panhandle, the
districts that are drawn for State Assembly, State Senate and Congress shall
meet a basic compactness standard, not
falling below a reasonably generous area-to-perimeter ratio limit set by the
court.
2. On
advice from a non-partisan and unbiased commission, the State Legislature may
assign boundaries to the districts of the State Assembly however they
see fit.
3. Once
those State Assembly boundaries are set, the drawing of boundaries for State
Senate and Congressional districts will be computer-generated with
the core provision that they must have MINIMAL OVERLAP with each other and with
the State Assembly districts, sharing as few voters as practically possible.
There
you have it. Three sentences. I’ve offered this suggestion for a decade and I
promise that (alas) you’ll find it nowhere else. But what does it mean?
It
means that the State Legislature may, if they choose, ignore the ‘neutral
commission’ and connive, jigger or gerrymander districts for one house —
the State Assembly — limited by some basic rule of compactness. But provision
#3 ensures that the districts for State Senate and Congress will be utterly different. The more carefully
the legislature’s majority partisans gerry-rig one house, the less effective
will be their efforts in the other two.
The
chief aim of gerrymander-cheating — to achieve government dominance by the most
rabid of hyper-partisans — will be devastated and then grow weaker, over time.
==
Illustrating the Minimal Overlap concept ==
For
some reason, the notion of minimal overlap seems obvious to some people, while
others find it difficult to grasp. So let’s try using illustrations.
Sentence/provision
#1 takes care of the worst, egregious cases, illustrated in our first figure.
As Figure 1 shows, a large fraction of gerrymander travesties would be eliminated by a compactness
rule, setting upper limits to perimeter-area ratios. This limit can be fairly
generous, since the rest of the solution happens through minimal overlap.
In Figure 2 we present a strawman set of six State Assembly districts that are
(for the sake of simplicity) highly compact.
Let’s
assume that the state legislature has, under rule #2, but limited by the
compactness rule #1, arranged these assembly districts to maximize gerrymander
benefits for the majority party.
Now, in
our third illustration, let’s overlay districts for State Senate. These are
required – under the court-ordered remedy of MINIMAL OVERLAP to be
computer-optimized so that each senate district shares as little territory and as few voters as possible with any one
assembly district.
Assuming
the compactness rule is enforced, and that Senate districts are truly drawn according
to provision #3, then Minimal Overlap – also called “anti-nesting” -- means
that the political character of the Senate will not be warped by gerrymandering. Citizens who were disenfranchised
before will likely get attention and an effective vote, in at least one
chamber.
The
districts for Congress, presumably larger, will nevertheless be kept off-kilter
from the gerried State Assembly districts. The party in power will thus only
get to have one chamber warped by self-serving, partisan political cheating.
Moreover,
even if this method has flaws, it is a clear limiting case that deprives the
courts of any “we see no clear remedy” excuse. For all its faults, Minimal
Overlap is palliative, equitable and enforceable. It also gives a nod to state
sovereignty and legislature privilege, by allowing the legislature to continue
complete, discretionary control over one chamber, while the other two are set
by a neutral computer reacting to their assembly boundaries.
==
Arguments against Minimal Overlap ==
One
objection that opponents to such a solution will assert is that voters should
be represented by “communities of interest.” For example, one of the commonly
used excuses for gerrymandering is that contorted arrangements are necessary in
order to ensure that minority populations get some representatives who are of
their ethnic persuasion.
There
are two, decisive answers:
(a) The
“communities of interest” argument is served by having one of three
chambers divided that way. So long as those communities of interest are firmly
ensconced and represented in one chamber, there is no inherent need for
duplication. This is an original merit of bicameral legislatures.
In
fact, there are strong arguments in favor of voters facing different coalition
needs, in different houses. Why should
their Assembly, State Senate and Congressional delegates be clones of each
other? Apportioned one way — say in the
Assembly — the community of interest might map onto national political parties,
or else be optimized for ethnic representation. But mapped orthogonally in
another house, entirely different matters of community interest — based on
geography, markets, or some other basis — might come to the fore. State
Senators will discuss different priorities at their town hall meetings than
Assembly members, to the benefit of political problem-solving.
Anyway,
a state senator who must negotiate among multiple constituencies and interests
will be a busier one, and possibly one who achieves a lot more to break down
our divisions.
(b)
This method is a fallback, intended to persuade the Supreme Court that
gerrymandering can be solved intrinsically, in a simple fashion that is
inherently more fair than the present, biased-partisan cheating. And what could
be simpler than three sentences?
Under
the Minimal Overlap method, voters who now feel completely disenfranchised in
all ways and in all chambers will thereupon very likely see their position improved. They will gain
a chance that at least one of their three representatives will be someone who
heeds their concerns. That is an improvement and a palliation of harm, and one
that is far from arbitrary.
Voters
thus would be guaranteed some relief from a conspiratorial injustice, in a
fashion that is simple to execute. States may
opt for some other method to eliminate the injustice. Many already have. But
this method provides a backstop ensuring that the worst, most pervasive effects
of gerrymandering will end.
==
Implications of Minimal Overlap ==
Notice
one “judo” aspect of this approach — that it allows hyper-partisans to have
their way - somewhat - for a while, in one house. This might lessen resistance
to reform by the most fundamentally powerful entities in American political
life, state assembly members. It also splits away the self-interest of State Senators,
reducing their motivation for hyper-partisanship - which is a desirable outcome
in its own right. Why should Assembly
members and Senators connive together? Vive la difference!
Moreover,
as State Senate and Congressional delegations become more moderate and less
partisan, they will then tend to pressure the State Assembly to damp down its
own cheating and partisanship.
The
Court should also be made aware of the effect that impartial redistricting has
had in many blue states and a few purples. While California remains dominated
by the Democratic Party, impartial redistricting and other reforms (e.g.
non-party primaries) have resulted in less
bitterness between parties, not more. Less acrimony. Even in districts that
wind up heavily Democratic or Republican, voters who are members of the
minority party now feel more listened-to than before.
Earlier
I mentioned that Illinois and Maryland and few other Democrat-dominated
holdouts still outrageously gerrymander. Former President Barack Obama and
former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder have specifically targeted these
states, arm-twisting state legislators to end gerrymandering. When those
Democratic Party holdouts comply, this horrifically blatant cheat and crime
will be seen as an odious offense perpetrated primarily by just one party
against the citizens of this great nation.
Nevertheless,
the best solution will come from the Supreme Court, whose past reluctance must
be met with a web of logic that allows no escape or wriggle room for Justices
Roberts, Alito and especially Kennedy, erasing their earlier excuses for
inaction. Minimal Overlap can serve as a example of a backstop remedy that’s
simple, fair, and undeniably better than the outrageous status quo.
======
David
Brin is a scientist, tech speaker/consultant, and author. His novel about our survival in the near
future is Existence. A film by Kevin Costner was based on The Postman. His 16 novels, including NY Times Bestsellers
and Hugo Award winners, have been translated into more than twenty
languages. Earth, foreshadowed global warming, cyberwarfare and the world wide
web.
Dr.
Brin serves on the external advisory board of NASA's Innovative and Advanced
Concepts program (NIAC). David appears frequently on shows such as Nova and The
Universe and Life After People, speaking about science and future trends. He
has keynoted scores of major events hosted by the likes of IBM, GE, Google and
the Institute for Ethics in Emerging Technologies.
His
non-fiction book -- The Transparent Society: Will Technology Make Us Choose Between Freedom and Privacy? -- won the Freedom of Speech Award of the American
Library Association. (Website: http://www.davidbrin.com/ )
References:
A Summer School for Mathematicians Fed Up with Gerrymandering, By Dawn Chan, New Yorker
8/2017.
Gerrymandering American Democracy: More Fragile Than We Think, by David
Brin, Ph.D., 2006.
The Supreme Court case that could shift how Americans vote rests on a simple math equation, Lola Fadulu, Quartz. 2017
FINAL NOTE: I tried taking this article every media outfit I could find. It's blatantly original and interesting and potentially of real value. When even the "good" outlets are rigidly exclusive, saving all slots for pals, nepotism and established old-farts, we are crippled as an imaginative, problem-solving society.
FINAL NOTE: I tried taking this article every media outfit I could find. It's blatantly original and interesting and potentially of real value. When even the "good" outlets are rigidly exclusive, saving all slots for pals, nepotism and established old-farts, we are crippled as an imaginative, problem-solving society.












