tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post6460889575402500149..comments2024-03-28T10:56:52.861-07:00Comments on CONTRARY BRIN: On privacy and Surveillance CapitalismDavid Brinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14465315130418506525noreply@blogger.comBlogger110125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-86794515805981130002020-12-01T21:57:33.818-08:002020-12-01T21:57:33.818-08:00They understand what to say to help you get out of...They understand what to say to help you get out of your predicament in a short period of time. They also understand how to argue the case or present the right documents to the courts. You are curious to know more about law offices, <a href="https://utah.instructure.com/eportfolios/44486/Home/Top_Ways_Of_Avoiding_Foreclosure" rel="nofollow"><b>click here</b></a>.geraldlewishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02705959429550189142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-443288880635770752020-10-28T04:08:38.504-07:002020-10-28T04:08:38.504-07:00Conservatorship attorney is often referred to as e...<a href="https://techsite.io/p/1762901" rel="nofollow"><b>Conservatorship attorney</b></a> is often referred to as estate executors. The term is derived from the fact that these attorneys oversee the financial affairs of the deceased person's estate. charliesmithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11223592353150690907noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-75196705330857018542020-07-06T04:37:37.236-07:002020-07-06T04:37:37.236-07:00A trust litigation attorney is simply an agreement...A <a href="https://canvas.umn.edu/eportfolios/3351/Home/Estate_Planning_101_Everything_That_You_Need_To_Know_About_The_Probate_Process" rel="nofollow"><b>trust litigation attorney</b></a> is simply an agreement that the property you give to a particular person is going to be owned by that person in perpetuity, and you can't claim back anything that's already been given to you. Alina joneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02303290444284614116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-39863834158225432022020-05-01T01:17:36.370-07:002020-05-01T01:17:36.370-07:00In fact, if you are ever accused of a crime you wa...In fact, if you are ever accused of a crime you want to make sure that you hire the best criminal defense attorney that you can find. If you want to get more interesting details about criminal defense lawyer, you may <b><a href="http://www.fxstat.com/en/user/profile/alexjoseph-192438/blog/34824724-What-Should-I-Ask-Before-Hiring-A-Criminal-Defense-Attorney-In-Chicago" rel="nofollow">go here</a></b>./ visit here/ visit this site.Alina Smithhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10438612710794896807noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-39120023998603235622020-04-30T03:24:19.980-07:002020-04-30T03:24:19.980-07:00It could be that a person who lives in your home b...It could be that a person who lives in your home but earns your mortgage is only there to collect your income tax return with the help of <b><a href="http://www.crweworld.com/usa/ny/new-city/localnews/news/1514145/no-estate-planning-documents-what-happens-to-your-property" rel="nofollow">probate attorney</a></b>. Fedrick Jacksonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06635346919213858886noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-78382252603932980132019-06-20T06:08:26.381-07:002019-06-20T06:08:26.381-07:00sorry...we've already moved onward
onwardsorry...we've already moved onward<br /><br /><br />onwardLarry Harthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01058877428309776731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-22951237430433690152019-06-20T06:07:23.309-07:002019-06-20T06:07:23.309-07:00Tony Fisk:
One of the methods used by British Int...Tony Fisk:<br /><i><br />One of the methods used by British Intelligence to obtain the daily Enigma code keys was as simple as checking the highly predictable forecasts from German weather stations, ...<br /></i><br /><br />There's a historical novel by Robert Harris called <i>Enigma</i> which uses a lot of that material as backstory. Although the plot of the book is fiction, the backdrop is Bletchley Park in 1943, and I learned a lot about that period from details in the book which I later confirmed from other sources to be accurate.Larry Harthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01058877428309776731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-64613986360612664772019-06-19T19:33:07.976-07:002019-06-19T19:33:07.976-07:00onward
onward
onward<br /><br />onward<br /><br />David Brinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14465315130418506525noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-85865697814518081272019-06-19T16:47:36.648-07:002019-06-19T16:47:36.648-07:00One of the methods used by British Intelligence to...One of the methods used by British Intelligence to obtain the daily Enigma code keys was as simple as checking the highly predictable forecasts from German weather stations, and sending a mosquito on a quiet day to bomb some minor facility. (This was shown in "The Imitation Game" as a breakthrough revelation, but it was bog standard procedure: people had been doing this stuff long before Cumberbatch.)<br /><br />WRENs doing the routine decoding got quite familiar with the German swear words often used as keys for Wehrmacht messages. They were very touched by a caring edict from German High Command forbidding the practice so as to protect proper young lady operators (in Berlin) from being exposed to such language.<br /><br />As David has often inferred, the length of your RSA keys may be necessary to keeping messages safe, but they are not sufficient.Tony Fiskhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14578160528746657971noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-27100446574713684522019-06-19T16:07:22.770-07:002019-06-19T16:07:22.770-07:00There's a nice comment in the back of Shea and...There's a nice comment in the back of Shea and Wilson's Illuminatus! which explains the difference between a cipher and a code. The example went something like this: You might intercept a secret Illuminati message in the Zwack cipher (that's a simple substitution cipher the lodges actually used, about 240 years ago) which decrypts to say "The Rising Hodge is coming". Unless you were privy to their internal affairs, you would have no idea who or what the Rising Hodge was.<br /><br />US Navy intel were up against a problem like this before the Battle of Midway. Having broken Imperial Japanese Navy crypto, they knew an attack on AF was imminent. But where was AF? They thought it might be Midway, and let the Japanese intercept a message that Midway was having a water shortage. Sure enough, the IJN crypto soon had a message that AF was short of water, and the US carriers sailed to intercept.TCBhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08153506222271955110noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-14300177197673628952019-06-19T15:30:24.835-07:002019-06-19T15:30:24.835-07:00Re: convenience and security, I suddenly hear Pink...Re: convenience and security, I suddenly hear Pink Floyd in my head...<br /><br /><i>If you negotiate<br />The minefield in the drive<br />And beat the dogs and cheat the cold<br />Electronic eyes<br />And if you make it past the shotgun in the hall,<br />Dial the combination,<br />Open the priesthole,<br />And if I'm in I'll tell you<br />What's behind the wall</i><br /><br />In my case I use a moderately secure network firewall, and another on the wifi (the thermostat isn't online, despite its occasional protests), and am further defended by the simple fact that if anyone does make it in, "what's behind the wall" just isn't all that interesting or lucrative.Jon S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/13585842845661267920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-74579951533276104832019-06-19T12:52:17.544-07:002019-06-19T12:52:17.544-07:00Larry,
An unfortunate fact of professional life i...Larry,<br /><br />An unfortunate fact of professional life is that the mischief maker often is an employee. We refer them as Insider Threats. They don't have to show up with guns and shoot up the place. Lazy insiders undermine the inconveniences of each defense layer or bypass them completely and intentionally. Even when they aren't walking out the door with the company's IP on a thumb drive, they can be making a hash of security procedures.<br /><br />Those man-traps only work if people understand why they are in place. If you are ever so unfortunate as to have someone show up and shoot up the place, you'll find people will use the man-trap properly. They'll understand its purpose by then. Short of that, training helps get a lot of people on board, but you have to scare them a bit to get the percentages up.Alfred Differhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01170159981105973192noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-21711652873418306252019-06-19T10:50:08.263-07:002019-06-19T10:50:08.263-07:00The New York Times tells us what we already know (...The New York Times tells us what we already know (emphasis mine) :<br /><br />https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/opinion/trump-2020-announcement.html<br /><i><br />Beyond that, in their ferocious defense of the president, Trump supporters are signaling that decency is a form of weakness, that cruelty is a welcome and highly effective political weapon and that the low road is the preferred road. At one point, Republicans were willing to tolerate Mr. Trump’s brutish tactics and reprehensible character as the price of party loyalty; <b>today many of them seem to relish it.</b> They see the dehumanization of others as a form of entertainment<br /></i>Larry Harthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01058877428309776731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-38195598238364920932019-06-19T10:37:49.460-07:002019-06-19T10:37:49.460-07:00First rule of crypto...
Heh. I think the real re...<i> First rule of crypto... </i><br /><br />Heh. I think the real reason people don't talk about crypto is they think it is hard. It isn't. It's not complex either. It IS detailed and gets 'mathy' if you want to pursue security proofs, but mostly it just LOOKS hard.<br /><br />What's hard to do is use it well... because it is an inconvenience. That's why apps designers are supposed to be folding it into our lives for us. Is anyone still using a browser that doesn't complain at us when we use http instead of https? Got an open wifi connection point at home? (check your thermostat) Do you regularly patch all apps that can communicate with the world? Inconvenience can be managed. You can bet the exploiters are doing the same thing with their tools. 8)Alfred Differhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01170159981105973192noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-69299719962022344872019-06-19T07:07:19.007-07:002019-06-19T07:07:19.007-07:00The snark is making it to mainstream media:
https...The snark is making it to mainstream media:<br /><br />https://www.electoral-vote.com/evp2019/Pres/Maps/Jun19.html#item-1<br /><i><br />Incidentally, as long as the other trappings of a presidential campaign—debates, rallies, heavy TV advertising, cattle calls, etc.—are being visited upon us a year earlier than is really necessary, the Orlando Sentinel decided to get a jump on the competition, and to make the first newspaper endorsement of the campaign, a mere 504 days before Election Day. One might wonder how that is possible, given that the Democrats don't even have a candidate yet. No matter, however, because the Sentinel's endorsement is: Not Donald Trump. That technically means that the Democrats could nominate Satan, the Unabomber, Santa Claus, Hillary Clinton, a talking donkey, or Forrest Gump, and that individual would already have more newspaper endorsements than the President does. And to make it worse, the Sentinel is a Republican paper. With the exceptions of 1964, 2004, and 2016, it has endorsed the Republican every time for six decades. It's going to be quite a campaign.<br /></i>Larry Harthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01058877428309776731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-39221036510679263652019-06-19T05:46:34.029-07:002019-06-19T05:46:34.029-07:00Regarding inconvenience as a deterrent or barrier....Regarding inconvenience as a deterrent or barrier...<br /><br />I posted this before, but at a a previous employer, they put in very expensive revolving doors designed to only let one person through at a time after that person "badged in". The idea was to prevent piggybacking or holding the door open for someone who might not have official permission to enter.<br /><br />But there was a huge outdoor courtyard with many doors into the building from there, and none of these had that sort of extra security. You did have to badge in, but someone on the inside could easily let anyone else into the building from the courtyard, and in good weather, it's fairly easy to wait for someone to open a door to go in or out and simply walk into the building before that door closes.<br /><br />The courtyard was easiest to get to from inside the building, after one has already badged in. However, it was quite possible to get there from outside--you simply had to walk around a large enclosed parking lot or vault a five foot wall from inside that lot. So to me, that always seemed to represent the worst of both worlds relative to security and inconvenience--employees who <b>are</b> allowed in have to go through layers of inconvenience which are nonetheless insufficient to prevent the motivated and determined mischief-maker from gaining access.<br />Larry Harthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01058877428309776731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-39235344467619499242019-06-19T05:04:24.762-07:002019-06-19T05:04:24.762-07:00First rule of crypto...First rule of crypto...scidatahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07152319593457629592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-11236365257606339162019-06-18T20:27:13.703-07:002019-06-18T20:27:13.703-07:00Tony,
Yup. I caught that part. Works best for peo...Tony,<br /><br />Yup. I caught that part. Works best for people who don't want to get caught. Citizens of other nations might not care much about our legal system, so I argue for something a bit more extra-legal... but not so much as to get myself into trouble. 8)<br /><br />As for crypto libraries, it is best to know their pedigree. If you don't know their source of randomness or don't know why you should, it is time to hit the books. If you don't know how resilient they are when attackers have access to one or more things like the cyphertext, past examples of plain and cyphertext pairs, the algorithms used, and so on, it is better to get the books AND a mentor. I wish I had, but I shouldn't share the stories explaining that. 8)<br /><br />Still... reading the list of known (released to the public) exploits of crypto systems will keep one busy.Alfred Differhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01170159981105973192noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-29114927234437122582019-06-18T19:29:09.376-07:002019-06-18T19:29:09.376-07:00@Alfred, Ilithi covered that in 'deterrence...@Alfred, Ilithi covered that in 'deterrence'. As he says, it is the biggest factor in making transparency work, where it theoretically manifests as "shame". I say 'theoretically' because it's painfully absent from the current political landscape.<br /><br />Speaking of laziness and obscurity, I must tell a little tale against myself. I was once working on an internal system that required people to log on. Simple trapdoor encryption would do, I thought, and simply used an encrypt routine provided by the PHP library.<br /><br />Some time later, I poked said routine a little more closely, and discovered it was only dealing with the first two characters in the password: Someone could use 'TWeedledum' and 'TWeedledee' to access the same account! The laziness on my part being not investigating more closely to begin with. The obscurity being in what security measures were actually in place. It wouldn't have done for that little football that gets booted around the White House, but was not ultra-catastrophic in the context. Even so, I had a discrete chat with our system folks, and we came up with something a little more robust.<br /><br />Tony Fiskhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14578160528746657971noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-89006236230699793112019-06-18T17:44:39.051-07:002019-06-18T17:44:39.051-07:00Inconvenience
Defense in Depth
to these I've ...Inconvenience<br />Defense in Depth<br /><br />to these I've learned one must also add these<br /><br />Detection<br />Consequences<br /><br />I'm a DoN contractor and we are taught that all the defensive layers are worth squat if no one is watching for breaches. They happen. When they do, IF they are detected, the next layer might not be breached.<br /><br />Even with all that, though, there must be a promised threat of consequences. Very inconvenient consequences. Preferably worse than the value the adversary gets from breaking in.<br /><br /><br />Our host covers these bases in his book and even points out that Detection is where our defenses can be most improved. If I know you are trying to discover my childhood bed-wetting experiences, I might be able to relay to you the dire consequences of public release BEFORE you do so. 8)Alfred Differhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01170159981105973192noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-62032335322348414572019-06-18T17:38:44.254-07:002019-06-18T17:38:44.254-07:00Hey hey. Ilithi Dragon is back! Now will someone ...Hey hey. Ilithi Dragon is back! Now will someone trawl past postings for clues in order to find Catfish n’ Cod and drag him/her/them/it back here? And yeah, where’s donzelion? Any others you guys miss? Try a googl search?<br /><br />Yes, inconvenience is a powerful aspect for all the reasons you state. I put it a little differently… If we (and out institutions and NGOs are shining light on the mighty, it reduces the number of henchmen they can trust and the size/volume of their conspiracies. <br /><br />(Hence the refutation of locum’s rave about it being Exxon doing the Gulf stunts. Moscow and Beijing and Riyadh have national protections against light and whistleblowers. A corporate thing isn’t impossible. But Putin and the Saudis are vastly, vastly more likely.)<br />Alas, inconvenience is also the bane of security, since lazy people cheat on their passwords and 2nd factors. And inconvenience has wrecked most experiments in micropayments (see my essays on that: I know the solution.)<br /><br />Stay safe down there Ilithi. And God bless the US Navy.<br /><br />David Brinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14465315130418506525noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-8109074358568948302019-06-18T16:58:34.896-07:002019-06-18T16:58:34.896-07:00Thanks Ilithi D, I appreciate your take on transpa...Thanks Ilithi D, I appreciate your take on transparency as a function of multi-layer deterrence. It's a valuable insight that, if not original, then at the least I missed seeing until now. <br /><br />Speaking of valued lurkers coming back to talk, is donzelion still around here? Or have they moved on like so many others? matthewhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17757867868731829206noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-24406377107862762042019-06-18T16:47:36.577-07:002019-06-18T16:47:36.577-07:00Multiple checks, however, are much harder bypass, ...Multiple checks, however, are much harder bypass, and much less likely to be, because even if each individual check has a significantly higher non-zero chance of being bypassed, say, 5% compared to 0.01%, the odds that the intruder would also bypass a SECOND, DIFFERENT layer of security that has the same odds of being bypassed are now 0.25%. And a third layer with a different method and the same odds, and the odds of bypassing all three are now 0.0125%. A fourth layer makes it 0.000625%.<br /><br />Statistically, multiple layers of lesser, cheaper protection can quickly provide much more defense against undetected breaches than a single, expensive, nigh-impenetrable layer.<br /><br />Those layers also provide defense against DETECTED breaches, which the single-layer system does not. With a single layer, once you've breached, even if you're detected, you're in. <br /><br />With multiple layers, not only do the odds of detecting a breach go up, you now have the ability to respond with greater security measures to detected breaches before they have fully bypassed or penetrated your defenses, dramatically increasing the effectiveness of responsive security measures.<br /><br />Yet, most privacy proponents champion single-point-failure privacy laws, laws that also provide selective inconvenience which particularly favors those who have concentrations of power that allow them to bypass or ignore laws, and will have similar effectiveness against abuse to the effectiveness of the Gros Michel banana's immune system against the Panama Wilt.<br /><br />Transparency, Reciprocal Accountability, and sousveillance are required, and effective, because they provide multiple layers of inconvenience with substantial defense-in-depth (with all the different ways that surveillance and abuse of surveillance can be detected and reported) that also exponentially increase the inconvenience of maintaining discretion. <br /><br />No other proposed solution has come anywhere close to providing similar effects.<br />Ilithi Dragonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10300247936272572280noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-24113975722675920122019-06-18T16:47:28.069-07:002019-06-18T16:47:28.069-07:00Which is where Dr. Brin's Transparency comes i...Which is where Dr. Brin's Transparency comes in, and why the Reciprocal-Accountability and sousveillance are such powerful tools: Social and cultural norms and ethical/moral standards create the need for discretion to do things that violate those norms and standards. Reciprocal-Accountability and sousveillance <i>exponentially increase</i> the effort required to achieve that discretion, thus making it EXTREMELY inconvenient to perform acts that violate social and cultural norms and ethical/moral standards.<br /><br />It won't completely PREVENT them, there will always eventually be someone willing and able to exert the effort required to overcome those inconveniences (or who think they are), and there will be some people who don't CARE about being discreet (and so that whole swath of inconveniences just doesn't apply to them), but it is a very powerful set of inconveniences to discourage unwanted actions, including unwanted breaches of privacy.<br /><br />This all ties in with DETERRENCE, which is the most effective focus of security measures, because the best security measures are not ones which prevent people from successfully carrying out an attempted breach; the best security measures are the ones that deter people from attempting the breach in the first place. Any attempt made has a non-zero chance of succeeding. Every attempt NOT made has an exactly zero chance of succeeding.<br /><br />Dr. Brin's Transparency is very much a system of DETERRENCE, by exponentially increasing the EFFORT required to overcome the INCONVENIENCE of DISCRETION.<br /><br />A fun little side-note on that, when it comes to deterrence-based security measures. How functional and effective your security measures actually are is often less important than how effective they APPEAR to be. Just LOOKING like a hard target goes a very long way to deterring attempts to breach your security, and is really the only thing that actually deters those attempts. You can actually be a hard target, but not look like it, and you're not going to deter a damn thing (unless your method of deterrence is one of not looking like a target at all).<br /><br />The reason why this works is because we are intelligent creatures that look for inconveniences to avoid, makes us more successful because we can better avoid unnecessary inconveniences, and thus unnecessary expenditures of effort/energy. This also has the side-effect of making us susceptible to the APPEARANCE of inconvenience that might not actually be there.<br /><br />Now, this won't stop the people who are determined to try, but it WILL drive them to expend more effort than would have otherwise been necessary, making them easier to detect, or at the very least, costing them more than it otherwise would have.<br /><br /><br /><br />This brings us to another fundamental principle of security, that so few people I've seen discussing privacy and transparency ever consider: Defense-in-depth.<br /><br />Most security experts will admit that there is no such thing as a 100% perfect system - any system can be broken into, bypassed, hacked, blown-through, or whatever, with sufficient effort. OR, somebody will find a fluke or flaw or vulnerability in the security measure that allows them to bypass it.<br /><br />This is why any competent security manager or planner will eschew a single, near-perfect barrier in favor of multiple lesser barriers.<br /><br />One security barrier can eventually be overcome, or bypassed, or have a vulnerability exploited, and if that's your only layer of defense, you're done. See Lessons Learned: Bananas.<br /><br />Multiple layers of security that are, individually not extremely strong, are far superior and more effective because of statistics. One single check can be bypassed. The odds of that happening are decidedly non-zero.<br />Ilithi Dragonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10300247936272572280noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587336.post-17019527085265054542019-06-18T16:47:04.432-07:002019-06-18T16:47:04.432-07:00So, a comment on Transparency and one of the funda...So, a comment on Transparency and one of the fundamental reasons behind why privacy laws don't work (and why Dr. Brin's Transparency is the best way to ensure privacy), because it is something that I CAN talk about, couched in terms of security, which is something I know a thing or two about. (Also, I'm still alive! Just busy.)<br /><br />The issue of unwanted surveillance is an issue of security. That's a "duh" no-brainer there, of course, but it must be said because so many so-called privacy experts and data security experts forget, ignore, or don't understand the most fundamental concept of security, and forget critical security principles.<br /><br />To properly understand how security works, any and all types and forms and categories of security for any thing, you must understand the most fundamental principle of ALL security measures, ever.<br /><br />Inconvenience.<br /><br />The reason <i>why</i> there is no such thing as a 100% perfect/impenetrable security system or measure is because every single measure of security ever devised is merely adding layers of inconvenience to access the thing you are trying to protect. No matter how inconvenient you make a thing, there will always, eventually, be someone, somewhere, who will be willing and able to expend the effort to overcome that inconvenience.<br /><br />Now, it is important that you do not underestimate the <i>power</i> of inconvenience. It is the fundamental principle that all security measures are based upon, after all.<br /><br />And inconvenience is a VERY powerful thing, because of biology, and physics, particularly entropy. <br /><br />Human beings are inherently lazy. That is not a criticism of the human species, it is a fact of being alive. ALL living creatures are inherently lazy. This is because there is no such thing as an unlimited supply of energy, so energy reserves and supplies must be reserved. We have a fundamental, biological imperative to be lazy. All living things do. <br /><br /><i>Inconveniences</i> increase the amount of energy, or <i>effort</i>, required to accomplish, achieve, and/or obtain things, and we are strongly programmed to avoid any unnecessary inconveniences - because unnecessary inconveniences waste effort, unnecessarily. <br /><br />Now, there are a lot of things that are worth suffering inconveniences for (this is why we're not all motionless carpets of moss or slime), but everyone has a limit to how much effort they are willing to expend to overcome inconveniences, varying by thing.<br /><br />For example. I have a fancy block. I don't want anyone to touch or take my fancy block.<br /><br />If I leave it out in the open, where anyone can see it, walk by it, touch it, or pick it up and walk away with it, the inconvenience to do so is negligible. <br /><br />If I put my fancy block in a locker without a lock on it, the level of inconvenience is increased. To know my fancy block is even there to be taken, people either have to have already known of my fancy block, or they have to go and look inside the locker to see if there are any fancy blocks inside of it.<br /><br />I can further increase the inconvenience by putting a padlock on the locker. Now, a padlock is not that difficult of a security measure to bypass. You don't even need bolt cutters - a pair of open-end wrenches and half-decent grip strength can break most padlocks, even so-called "high security" padlocks. BUT, you have to suffer the inconvenience of carrying around bolt cutters or a pair of open-end wrenches, or going to retrieve them. Put that locker in a building where the locker itself is out of sight, or make the locker a safe, put a lock on the house, put a moat of lava around the house, all of these things just add additional layers of inconvenience. They can all be bypassed, with sufficient effort, but the effort required to do so is a huge deterrent. <br /><br />And if you want to do so without being seen or detected, that's even more of an inconvenience.<br /><br />The need for discretion is a VERY powerful inconvenience, after all.Ilithi Dragonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10300247936272572280noreply@blogger.com